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Final offer arbitratio·n and the State Sector 
Act 
Alan Geare• 
The first version of the State Sector Bill (State Sector Bill {l)) specified that the Labour 
Relations Act 1987 would apply in the State Services with respect to dispute settlement 
Under the Labour Relations Act 1987, the procedure of conciliation may be used only in 
situations involving two or .more employers (s.l34(4)). Hence, to be consistent, 
conciliation was not available as an option in the state services. Furthennore, arbitration 
under the Labour Relations Act only operates when both parties agree to its use, and thus 
compulsory arbitration is no longer available. Thus, the State Sector Bill (I) presented 
the state unions ·with the scenario of losing their :right to annual general adjusunents and 
with the possibility of arbitration no longer being available (should the State Services 
Commission (SSC) or the corresponding " ~employer" refuse to agree to arbitration). In 
addition to these very :r~eal problems, ther~e were also fears among some groups that they 
would/could lose other rights (such as parental leave) not written into detern1inations or 
otherwise provided for in legislation. Some state unions deplored the fact that State S"~.ctor 
Bill (1) encouraged strike action - and went out on strike in protest. After protests and 
strike action, and further submissions, a second version of the State Sector Bill appeared 
dated 16 March 1988. This, State S ~ector Bill (2), provides the basis for the follo\ving 
discussions. It is assumed the State Sector Act, due to 'take effect from April 1, will not 
be significantly altered from this. 
State Sector Bill (2) provides a number of changes with respect to dispute settlement. 
Under Schedule 1 B, provision is made allo\ving disputes to be setUed by conciliation and 
arbitration. Hence, the state unions may no\v negotiate awards as well as ag~eements. Of 
course, arbitration, as in the private sector, would be provided by the Arbitration 
Commission, but only if both the union and the SSC agree. The Labour Government, 
however, has made a further "concession", in that they now do allow for compulsory 
arbitration. Under s.48(4) of State Sector Bill (2), if a union requests by 30 June 1988 for 
a compulsory arbitration clause, the sse shall agree to the request and the clause will be 
included in the award or agreement. The concession is not overly generous as it has two 
fishhooks embedded in it The first is that the union must agree to waive its rights to 
engage in lawful strikes over disputes of interest or new matters granted under s.233 (la-
Ic) of the Labour Relations Act 1987. ~Given that the state unions have been claiming 
that they never want to strike, this provision may not be deemed to be serious. The 
second fishhook is that the type of arbitration provided is kno\vn as final offer arbitration. 
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Background to final offer arbitration 
Final offer arbitration (FOA) first received general attention in academic circles after an 
influential paper by Stevens (I 966). Among the flurry of papers gen~rated by Steve~s' 
work, one claimed that FOA was first used by a Toronto hydro engineer Val Scott 1n 
1964. However the clairn that FOA is of recent origin has been disputed by Treble (1986) 
who pointed out that FOA was used intermittently by conciliation ~ru:ds in s~veral 
British industries from 1860 on. Treble states that the concept ong1nated 1n the 
Nottingham hosiery industry in 1860, but although FOA was available it was never 
actually used and it was later introduced, and used, in the coalmining industry. Treble 
( 1986) noted: 
The most striking facts about the experience of lhe boards are that final offer 
arbitration did not last long in most coalfields and that opposition to it came., not 
from the negotiators, but from the arbitrators. (p.92). 
Collective bargaining, conciliation, arbitration (conventional style) and FOA are all 
dispute settling processes. They can be employed to settle interest disputes (over the 
establishment of agreen1ents), rights disputes (over the interpretation or application of 
agreements) or personal grievances. The focus of this paper is primarily on interest 
disputes. 
It is generally conceded that for collective bargaining not to be a sham, unions must have 
the right to strike or otherwise they will always operate from a position of weakness. 
Hence, if the freedom to strike is curtailed or withdrawn, access to arbitration is provided 
as compensation. Thus in New Zealand's private sector, since strikes over rights disputes 
are illegal, arbitration from the Labour Court is provided .. Under the Labour Relations Act 
1987, strikes over interest disputes are now legal (with provisos), so arbitration is not a 
guaranteed option, although available if both parties agree. 
The objective of conventional arbitration is lO provide an acceptable and workable 
solution. The role of the arbitrator is to consider the cases put by both sides and then to 
use "arbitral discretion" to reach a decision and make an award. It is clearly possible that 
the arbitrator may decide totally in favour of one party, but usually there is a compromise 
between the two positions, not only to make the settlement more acceptable to both sides 
but also to satisfy the arbitrator's concept of justice. 
FOA is a variant of conventional arbitration which requires the arbitrator to choose one or 
other of the two parties' final offers. The arbitrator is not allowed to compromise, and 
cannot be concerned with acceptability and workability, but instead must accept the 
union's or employer's .final offer. Hence, taken sirnply as a method of arbitration (as 
opposed to a method of dispute settle1nent), FOA is clearly inferior to conventional 
arbitration. The latter can operate as FOA when the situation warrants, or can make 
compromises when that appears more suitable. As already quoted, Treble (1986) pointed 
out that in the nineteenth century, opposition to the use of FOA came from the 
arbitrators. Weitzman and Stochaj (1980, p.33) analyse the views of eighteen arbitrators 
involved in both conventional arbitration and FOA and discovered that ''two-thirds of the 
interviewees stated that they VlOuld prefer conventional arbitration over final-offer 
arbitration, because the former gives the neutral more discretion and the ability to 
compromise differences." 
However FOA was not designed as a method of arbitration so much as a method of dispute 
settlement, with objectives differing from conventional arbitration. Unlike conventional 
arbitration, the objective of FOA is not to achieve an acceptable and workable solution. 
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Instead the objective of its original proponents was to make the cost of failing to reach a 
negotiated settlement so high that both parties would be forced .. by fear .. to negotiate and 
reach a seulem~ent. Scott, the hydro-engineer mentioned earlier, is of the view that 
"arbitration of any kind is only an alternative to strikes and lockouts and not a substitute 
for negotiations. Henc~e there is no reason to make arbitration just or pleasant" (Perigoe, 
1973, p. 31). 'Thus, Scott developed FOA which he never intended to be a means of 
producing a just or pleasant solution but rather, to use the colourful language of its 
proponents, he intended it to be "the hydrogen bomb poised above the bargaining table 
whose very terror should ensure its non-use" (Holden,1976, p. 28). The ~~non-use" is 
brought about (in theory) by the fact that the losing party will have gained nothing from 
the arbitration process and will have to accept the other party's final offer (or demand}. It 
is this high cost of being forced to accept what could be a demand so great that it is 
economically crippling, or an offer so low that it would mean loss of office for the union 
negotiators that is intended to deter the parties from resorting to FOA and force them to 
negotiate a settlement 
In general, interest disputes are not over a single issue but over a number of issues. 
Hence there are a number of obvious variations of FOA. Under the basic variant, the 
arbitrator selects what he or she believes to be the more reasonabl ~e of the union's or 
management's final package. These could involve, for exampl~e, staffing levels, working 
conditions, the payment system, the level of the basic pay rate and holidays. The 
arbitrator has to judg,e on an overall basis which package is the most reasonable. This 
clearly could result in some issues being decided in favour of a party which, on those 
particular issues, was less reasonable. An alternative variant is that the arbitrator should 
consider each issue in turn and select the most reasonable final offer for each issue 
separately. There is thus compromise over the package as a whole but not for any single 
issue. One observer claims that the case for FOA : 
is clearer in the single issue dispute than in the multiple i~sue dispute. In the latter, 
which is the usual case, difficulties of calculating the rate of exchange and trade-off 
among the various disputes increase the likelihood that the Board's decision will not 
be an optimal one (Rogow y 1973, p.28). 
This observation overlooks the fundamental purpose of FOA which is to increase the 
po~ential costs of failing to negotiate a settlement, not to produce an optimal decision. 
Thus if one accepts the rationale behind FOA, one is logically compelled to pre~er total 
package arbitration to issue by issue arbitration, since there is n1ore uncertainty and the 
potential costs of not settling are even greater. 
The FOA offered under the State Sector Bill (2) ( and in the final act - Editor ) is ''in 
'total", with s.8 of Schedule 1 B stipulating that the Arbitration Commission "must accept 
in full the final offer made by one of the parties"' and further that it "may not adopt only a 
part or parts of one final offer and a part or parts of the other final offer". 
Evaluation of final offer arbitration 
This paper will give an evaluation of FOA, considering in turn: a) the theoretical 
justification for FOA according to its proponents; b) how FOA works according to 
laboratory simulations; c) how FOA should work according to mathematical models and d) . 
how FOA appears to work in practice. There will be a concluding discussion with regard 
to FOA and the State Sector Act. 
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The author has previously expressed the view that "the basic logic underp.inning the 
concept of FOA is weak" (Geare, 1978, p.385) and nothing that has occurred in the 
intervening decade has altered that opinion. The theo~etical justification for FOA seems to 
rest on t~ee inter-dependent premises: 
Premise 1 : That conventional arbitration is inferior to collective bargaining as a method 
of dispute settlement. 
Premise 2 : That dispute settlement processes should encourage collective bargaining. 
Premise 3 : That conventional arbitration has a "narcotic effect" (Feuille,I975, p.304) on 
the parties causing then1 to become "arbitration addicts" while FOA discourages its use 
and encourages collective bargaining. 
Premise 1 seems to be regarded by some writers as a universal truth which needs no 
defence or justification. Thus, Northrup states that "free collective bargaining is the best 
solution we have been able to devise to the employer-employee relations"' (1966,pp.182-
3). However, this assertion is in fact unproven. This does not mean that the premise is in 
fact false, but does support the view expressed by Hancock a quarter of a century ago that 
there were "no reasons which are neither trivial nor double-edged advanced by ... 
(supporters of either side) ... which warrant any firan preference for arbitration or collective 
bargaining". (Hancock,1962, p.20) 
In lhe earlier paper already quoted, this writer has asserted that the perceived superiority of 
collective bargaining over arbitration is based on a number of myths - that bargaining 
necessarily involves a "meeting of minds", that the process of bargaining is necessarily to 
narrow differences while that of arbitration is to broaden difCerences, that bargaining 
produces more cominitrncnt and finally that arbitration involves a multitude of lawyers. 
That earlier paper argued that these myths do not have univ~e.rsal va'lidity and indeed that 
the evidence frorn the New Zealand private sector shows that in the New Zealand context 
the myths are indeed false. 
As Farber (1981) points out "the major criticism of conventional interest arbitration is 
that the arbitrator tends to "split the difference" between the final positions of the parties" 
(p. 70). This criticism, however is logically absurd. If arbiLration did simply involve 
"splitting the difference" then clearly the respondent in any dispute situation would place 
their counter-after such that the n1iddle point between the offers coincided with the 
respondent's actual preferred position. They would then move only in response to an equal 
move by the applicant. For example: 
a) A union demands a 28 percent wage increase whilst employers wish to give 6 percent. 
Employers therefore counter-offer a 22 percent decrease and will move only in response t.o 
a union decrease. Splil-lhc-difference arbitration would always result in a 6 percent 
• Increase. 
b) Employers demand a r~eduction in staffing from 320 to 250. The union wants the 
status quo preserved, so it counter-demands an increase in staffing to 390 and wiH reduce 
this only in response to an increase from the employers. Split-the -difference arbitration 
would always result in the status quo. 
These situations are clearly unrealistic, because arbitration is never so simplistic and 
predictable. 
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Notwithstanding the palpable stupidity of the argumen~ many do adhere to the "split the 
difference" belief. This is probably because some arbitration outcon1cs appear to split the 
difference. When this occurs, however, it is like] y, as Farber ( 1981) suggests, to arise 
from the fact that: 
the parties will actually take final positions that are located synunetrically around the 
arbitrator's notion of the equitable outcom,e. Thus, it is the expected arbitration 
outcome which determines the bargaining positions rather than the reverse (p.71 ). 
Collective bargaining and arbitration (and indeed FOA) are sirnply processes in the 
industrial relations system. At any time, the vast majority of any one, two or three of the 
major parties (government as legislator, employers, unions and work groups) may prefer 
one particular process. ~Clearly, if all thr~ee prefer one process then it will be selected for 
the time being. In all probability, the parti.es will have disagreements within themselves 
and between each other. The only logical conclusion about the superiority of processes is 
to argue from the point of view of a particular party at a particular time. Rather 
obviously, ·weaker parti~es tend to favour arbitration while parties in strong positions 
favour coll~ective bargaining. At different times, ~employers in the New ,Zealand private 
sector have supported and at other times opposed arbitration .. The unions have behaved in 
identical fashion. 
Premise 2 is clearly both simply a value judgement and is also totally dependent for its 
basic logic on premise 1 being accepted. If in fact collectiv,e bargaining is D.Qt necessarily 
superior to arbitration, there seems no logical reason why the chosen process should 
encourage bargaining. 
The third premise is apparently the creation of the then United States Secretary of Labor, 
W. Willard Wirtz, who in 1964 clain1ed that "a statutory requirement that labor disputes 
be submitted to arbitration has a narcotic effect on private bargainers ... they will tum to 
it as an easy and habit forming release from the ... obligation of hard responsible 
bargaining" (Wheeler, 1977, p.ll7). This rnetaphor appealed to Arncrican writers (such as 
Feuille) \Vho incorporated it into their writings referring to arbitration addicts. Since the 
first premise is unproven, then whether or not arbitration produces "arbitration addicts" 
could be a non-issue. Indeed, if arbitration is actualJy a superior process to bargaining, the 
addiction would be a blessing not a bane. However, again as argued earlier by this writer, 
New Zealand experience in the priva~e sector has shown that the availability of arbitration 
does not necessarily result in the parties always resorting to it. Certainly the negotiations 
which pr~ecede possible arbitration will clearly be influenced by the likely arbitration 
award, but the strictly limited use 1nade over the years of the Court of Arbitration and 
Arbitration Court shows that the premise is not true in New Zealand's ~experience. 
It has already been pointed out that as FOA provides a more limited scope for arbittation 
than conventional arbitrnlion, it is clearly inferior if judged as a type of arbitration . In any 
dispute, if the "best" (ho\vever detern1ined) award is one or other final offer, then that can 
be achieved by conventional arbitration as well as FOA. However, if the "best" award is a 
comprornise, FOA cannot achieve it. For FOA to be other than an unpleasant joke, it 
must achieve what its proponents claim -both parties being scared into negotiation which 
results in either a settlement or little difference in the final positions. 
There are difficulties with accepting evidence both from actual experience and fron1 
laboratory simulations and mathematical modelling. Notz and Starke (1978) point out 
that field evidence gives contradictory results: 
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partially due to the studies being either cross-sectional or case, and the resu~ts raise 
many questions about their internal validity so that there are many alternative and 
plausible explanations for the relationships observed (p.190). 
They go on to po!nt out that "those issues of internal validit~ can be dealt ~ith in. the 
laboratory". However laboratory sirn ulations and nlathematJcal models ra1se ser1ou~ 
questions as to the extent to which these results can be extended to ap~!Y to ac.tual 
industrial relations situations. As Bazerman and Farber (1982, p.88) observe cone) us1ons 
dra'"'n from data based on sin1ulations are not always generalizable to actual cases.'' 
Given these caveats this paper will now examine such evidence as exists upon v/hich to 
evaluate FOA. 
Laboratory simulations 
There have been a number of laboratory simulations where subjects, usually students but 
son1etimes practising arbitrators, role play dispute situations. In general, they were 
expected to negotiate a settlement with the possibility of conventional arbitration or F~OA 
if a seulemen t could not be reached. Some studies tried to compar~e conventional 
arbitration with FOA, while others were examining the process of FOA. 
Cornparative studies produced conflicting results. Two studies (Notz and Starke,1978, 
Starke and Notz,1981) produced results supportive of FOA and concluded that FOA does 
result in converging offers. However Johnson and Tullar (1 972) found that in situations 
\\'here there was a high need for face-saving, FOA was appreciably worse than 
conventional arbitration at producing convergence. 
Studies on the process of using FOA produced results which should interest policy-
Inakcrs. In separate studies, Bazennan and Neale (1982), and de Nisi and Dworkin (1 981) 
found that training in FOA and a thofough understanding of the implications of FOA were 
·liequired before the~e was any change in behaviour of the subjects. Hence if policy-makers 
·'Yvant FOA to change behaviour- then these studies suggest prior education is essential. 
A study (Farber and Bazerman, 1986) using actual arbitrators (there are sufficient numbers 
in the United States to be able to experiment with thern), discovered that the decision 
process by \vhich arbitrators make conventional awards or FOA awards is the same. With 
knowledge of the arbitrators' ideal conventional award, the researchers could accurately 
predict the FOA award in just under 90 percent of the cases. This fact however is 
disturbing. It means that in 10 percent of cases, the arbitrators 1nade illogical awards 
(based on their own values). This is indeed a prime argun1ent against FOA. If the parties 
do not converge, then one or other extreme offer has to be chosen. Evidence suggests that 
in such a case the "least ridiculous" offer may not. always be picked. 
Mathematical n1odels 
During the 1980s a nun1ber of studies appeared \vhich assessed FOA according to 
rnathematical models, usualJy ernploying utility theory and garne theory. Those tested 
whether convergence of offers can be predicted and whether Nash optimal solutions (Nash 
1950 and 1953) arise. These studies have littJe face validity to non-mathematicians, and 
one suspects that the general attitude to such studies is to accept them if they support 
one's preconceived ideas and dis1niss them as obvious rubbish if they do not Practitioners 
who are non- mathematicians will be interested to read such confident and definite 
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statements as : "each party calculates the expected utility to them of using the arbitration 
procedure: 
(Farber and Katz,1979,p.57). 
This writer would be much happier to fead '*the behaviour of the parties can be explained 
to some extent by the following expected utilities ... " 
As with laboratory studies, the results from the mathematical modelling are not definite, 
but tend to be unsupportive of FOA. Brams and M'errill (1983) consider their model 
demonstrates that in a situation of uncertainty (as Lo the arbitrator's considered optimum 
solution) FOA produces divergence not convergence. Farber (1980) considers that 
negotiated settlements reached under FOA wiU be skewed against the more risk-averse 
party. If his findings are correct, then state unions should consider whether they or the 
Gov~em,ment are more risk averse. In the view of this author, the probability is that, for 
example, teachers unions are more risk-averse than the Government Treble (1985) has a 
model which suggests that "F·OA is not likely to be more successful than CA 
(Conventional Arbitration) in producing agreements although the observed spread of final 
offers is likely to be less in FOA than inCA" (p.181). 
Field evidence 
If FOA is ever employed, then it has failed according to its original proponents. As 
already mentioned, they assumed the risk of Josing everything would be such that parties 
would never ~employ FOA. Thus., to a certain extent one could claim that if FOA is 
actually used it has failed. Hov.,ever, FOA should also be judged as a method of dispute 
settlement. lf everybody enjoys a gamble, and are prepared to live \vith lhe consequences, 
then possibly one should support FOA even if it appears theoretically unsound. 
FOA has predominantly been used in the public sector in the U.S., and also in setting 
salaries for professional baseball players. In most situations strikes are illegal {and the 
bans are ~effective) so the "acceptability'' of the FOA decisions are hard to evaluate. 
Certainly some v.1riters are enthusiastic about FOA, while others are not. 
The results of FOA are difficult to evaluate. Ashenfelter and Blooin (1983) warn that "it 
takes careCul analysis before box scores or win-loss records are of any value in detern1ining 
the integrity or fairness of an arbitration system" (p.539). In their two papers, they 
analyse results in .New Jersey, a state where a "remarkable statute provides for 
conv·entional arbitration of pay disputes if the t\VO parties can agree to this, but requires 
the use of final-offer arbitration if they cannot (1984, p.lll). They point out that while 
unions win at F·OA two-thirds of the time, the increases Lhey get from FOA are lower 
than under conventional arbitration. They win at FOA because they are less ambitious 
than the employers, but they in fact do better under conventional arbitration (1983, 
pp.538-9). 
Chelius and Dworkin (1980, p.305) consider that FOA operates well and "'appears to 
encourage bilateral collective bargaining and redistribute power in much the same manner 
as would the right to strike." On the other hand Robitzek (1979) ~considers FOA operates 
as an alte.mative to collective bargaining. Buxton, Chief of the Employee and Labor 
Relations Division at Air Force Command HQ, wrote that agreeing to FOA \Vas "rash and 
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somewhat akin to playing Russian roulette'' (1986, p. 1 71). Perlman (19?9), ~ p~oponent 
of FOA, enthuses over its success in encouraging negotiated settlements 1n M1Ch1gan and 
Oregon but concedes that the reverse occurred in Wisconsin and Massachusetts. 
Conclusions from th ~e evidence 
It appears to this writer impossible to conclude from the evidence as to what will occur in 
any particular situation if FOA is employed. It is possible that it will encourage more 
settlements than would occur if conventional arbitration were available. This, however, is 
not assured. If the two offers are feasonably close then the panies may in fact prefer FOA 
awards, but again this is not assured. What al1 parties must be aware of is that there is a 
possibility under FOA that an extreme award has to be made with very major 
consequences indeed. 
The Labour Government has made it clear that jt wants unions to negotiate settlements 
rather than use arbitration. It has given unions the right to strike (within 60 days of the 
expiry of the award or agreement) and hence feels under no obligation to provide 
arbitration. This latest move ro offer FOA can be considered part of an overall strategy, 
rather than evidence that the Government sees particular merit in FOA. 
The unions have only lhree months to ensure they get a compulsory arbitration clause, as 
the legislation requires that the unions decide whether to request the clause by 30 June 
1988. After that the State Services Commission is not obliged to agree to it. By putting 
in the time constraint, the Government is suggesting that F,OA is an advantage to the 
unions. They win clearly be diverted from their straight out opposition to the State 
Sector Act. Furthermore, if the unions reject the offer on the basis that they have to agree 
to a two-year no strike agreement, they are made to look shallow and insincere in their 
claims that they object to the State Sector Act because it obliges them to go on strike. If 
unions object to FOA because it has theoretical weaknesses, they will be told that if they 
are reasonable, they have nothing to fear. The problem of course is that in some disputes 
both sides tak~e widely differing views and both sides feel they are right and reasonable. 
To conclude, this writer does not consider that FOA will necessarily cause chaos, but does 
believe the possibility exists of an extreme award having to be made. THe resulting 
problems could be severe. At this stage, it is also possible that no union will opt for 
FOA and it becomes a total non- event or that unions or the Government happily accept 
FOA awards. 
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